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I.

INTRODUCTION

An arbitral tribunal’s power to decide its own jurisdiction is its
kompetenz-kompetenz and is a “conceptual cornerstone[] of international
arbitration as an autonomous and effective form of international dispute
resolution.”1 The inherent requirement that parties to a valid arbitration
agreement (AAG) must honor that agreement by arbitrating their disputes
precludes national courts from tampering with the result of a valid arbitral
1. Robert H. Smit, Separability and Competence-Competence in International Arbitration: Ex
Nihilo Nihil Fit? Or Can Something Indeed Come from Nothing?, 13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 19, 19
(2002).
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award.2 National courts must respect and uphold valid AAGs as enshrined
in Article II(3) of the New York Convention:
The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a
matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement
within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the
parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said
agreement is null and void, inoperative[,] or incapable of being
performed.3
However, because the Convention does not provide a firm definition as
to what defects qualify as “null and void, inoperative[,] or incapable of being
performed,”4 States are free to exercise significant discretion.5 State
discretion under the Convention extends to when and under what
circumstances national courts will hand over jurisdictional decisions to
tribunals.6 The result has been unreliable practices of kompetenz-kompetenz
in different nations across the globe, calling into question whether
kompetenz-kompetenz is truly the “inherent power”7 of arbitral tribunals.
This paper analyzes differing views and approaches to kompetenzkompetenz and proposes a workable framework of kompetenz-kompetenz
for the future. Part II provides an overview of the general principle of
kompetenz-kompetenz, discussing the views of some of the leading
international commercial arbitration scholars on kompetenz-kompetenz.8
Part III analyzes the approaches taken by the United States and the United
Kingdom and uses them as helpful illustrations of kompetenz-kompetenz in
practice.9 Part IV notes the shortcomings of the aforementioned approaches
and proposes a limited form of negative kompetenz-kompetenz as the
2. Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, Negative Effect of Competence-Competence: The
Rule of Priority in Favour of the Arbitrators, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS: THE NEW YORK CONVENTION IN PRACTICE 257, 257
(Emmanuel Gaillard & Domenico di Petro eds., 2008).
3. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
art. II(3), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
4. Id.
5. See Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 2, at 258.
6. Id.
7. NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES WITH ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER,
REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: STUDENT EDITION 347 (5th ed. 2009).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
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solution.10 Part V concludes.11
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Basic Notion of Kompetenz-Kompetenz
In general, kompetenz-kompetenz “recognizes the authority of arbitral
tribunals to determine their own jurisdiction.”12 It provides arbitrators with
the authority to determine their own jurisdiction to increase efficiency of the
arbitral system without judicial interference.13 The level of kompetenzkompetenz granted to tribunals varies from country to country14 as States
seek to balance two competing interests: preservation of legitimate claims
against arbitral jurisdiction and reduction of judicial interference and
delaying tactics.15
Two essential theories allow kompetenz-kompetenz to properly
function: (1) an arbitral tribunal is given the power to decide its own
jurisdiction (kompetenz-kompetenz); and (2) the arbitration clause is treated
as separate and independent from the remainder of the contract
(separability).16 While an in-depth discussion of separability is beyond the
scope of this paper, a brief discussion on its importance in connection with
kompetenz-kompetenz is vital. Separability and kompetenz-kompetenz
work together with the common goal of preventing early judicial
interference with arbitration.17 Separability, by treating the AAG as separate
and distinct from the remainder of the contract, protects a tribunal’s ruling
on jurisdiction from subsequent failures of the contract.18 However,

10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
12. George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International Commercial Arbitration, 37
YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 14–15 (2012) [hereinafter Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem].
13. See id. at 14.
14. Compare infra Part III.A (analyzing the U.S. approach to kompetenz-kompetenz), with infra
Part III.B (analyzing the U.K. approach to kompetenz-kompetenz).
15. John J. Barceló III, Who Decides the Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction? Separability and
Competence-Competence in Transnational Perspective, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1115, 1119
(2003) (recognizing that not all parties that resist arbitrations are obstructionists).
16. BLACKABY & PARTASIDES WITH REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 348–49.
17. Barceló III, supra note 15, at 1116.
18. BLACKABY & PARTASIDES WITH REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 348–51. For
example, separability permits the tribunal to hold at the merits stage of a dispute that no valid
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“whereas separability is universally accepted, [k]ompeten[z]-[k]ompeten[z]
is controversial and has spawned a range of different national responses.”19
All jurisdictional decisions made by a tribunal under its kompetenzkompetenz are subject to judicial review, and courts have the final word on
jurisdiction.20 A tribunal’s kompetenz-kompetenz power varies from
country to country and sometimes differs within jurisdictions of the same
country.21
These transnational inconsistencies have significant
repercussions. Without having the power to determine its own jurisdiction,
an arbitral tribunal would have to halt proceedings each time a party
challenged its jurisdiction and refer the issue to national courts, greatly
diminishing the efficiency of arbitration.22 Inconsistent views of kompetenzkompetenz also undermine the enforcement of arbital awards as the courts of
the country of enforcement may perform their own jurisdictional review—
applying the appropriate law of the AAG—and separately conclude that
kompetenz-kompetenz was not properly conducted, refusing enforcement of
the award.23
B. Positive v. Negative Kompetenz-Kompetenz
Kompetenz-kompetenz has a positive dimension (granting arbitrators
the power to determine their own jurisdiction) and a negative dimension
(prohibiting courts from interfering with arbitrators’ kompetenz-kompetenz
power at the outset of the arbitral process).24 Challenges to arbitral
jurisdiction can occur at one of three stages in the arbitration process: (1) at
the initiation of the arbitral process; (2) during the arbitral process; or (3)
contract exists without destroying its initial ruling that the AAG portion of the contract granted
proper jurisdiction. Id.
19. Barceló III, supra note 15, at 1123.
20. BLACKABY & PARTASIDES WITH REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 351. It is not
possible for kompetenz-kompetenz to “completely divest national courts of all authority to consider
challenges to arbitral jurisdiction because it is the courts (and the state’s enforcement resources),
ultimately, which must enforce any arbitration agreements and awards. . . .” Smit, supra note 1, at
25.
21. BLACKABY & PARTASIDES WITH REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 351.
22. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem, supra note 12, at 14. This has led some authors to argue
that kompetenz-kompetenz should extend beyond granting tribunals the power to decide their own
jurisdiction to actually prohibit courts from hearing jurisdictional challenges until after the issuance
of a final award. See infra notes 31–37 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Part III.B.1 (discussing this very scenario that occurred in Dallah).
24. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem, supra note 12, at 16.
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after the final award.25 While the timing of jurisdictional challenges is
largely within the discretion of the parties, the kompetenz-kompetenz rules
of the law applicable to the AAG inform the timing of challenges.26 The
relevant law’s stance on positive and negative kompetenz-kompetenz is
informative of the jurisdictional challenge options open to parties.
The primary issue in determining the appropriate extent of kompetenzkompetenz is the timing of judicial interference and the extent of review of a
tribunal’s jurisdiction ruling.27 Positive kompetenz-kompetenz refers to
arbitrators’ power to determine their own jurisdiction and is recognized in a
majority of countries.28 In contrast, courts do not universally acknowledge
negative kompetenz-kompetenz because it requires courts to forfeit their
judicial authority to hear a dispute regarding arbitral jurisdiction until after
the issuance of a final award.29 Similarly, commentators have asserted
varied approaches as to the proper approach to kompetenz-kompetenz and
the role of negative kompetenz-kompetenz in international arbitration.30
Under negative kompetenz-kompetenz, courts restrict their review of
jurisdiction at the initial stages of the arbitral process to a prima facie review
of the AGG to determine if the agreement is “null and void, inoperative[,] or
incapable of being performed.”31 Beyond that, national courts cannot
interfere with a tribunal’s ruling on jurisdiction until after a final award has
been issued.32 This makes arbitrators the first—although not sole—judges of
jurisdiction33 and respects the autonomous nature of international
commercial arbitration.34
25. BLACKABY & PARTASIDES WITH REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 351.
26. Id. at 351–53.
27. See Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 2, at 258; see also Alan S. Rau, Everything You Really
Need to Know about “Separability” in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1,
93–94 (2003) (categorizing kompetenz-kompetenz as a timing issue).
28. See Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 2, at 259 (Positive kompetenz-kompetenz “empowers
an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction without any illogicality arising from the fact that it
is not a permanent body. . . .”).
29. See id. at 259–60.
30. See infra notes 35–40 and accompanying text.
31. See Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 2, at 259; see New York Convention, supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
32. See Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 2, at 259.
33. Id. at 259–60. “Adopting a prima facie standard of review, on the other hand, is nothing
more than accepting a temporary deference to the arbitrators, as opposed to a prima facie suspicion
[of] the arbitrators. . . .” Id. at 268.
34. See Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 2, at 269.
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Proponents of negative kompetenz-kompetenz assert two primary
arguments in its favor: (1) recourse to courts during arbitral proceedings
permits judicial interference into what should be an autonomous process;
and (2) recourse to courts before the issuance of a final award encourages
delaying tactics.35 Gaillard and Banifatemi contend that positive kompetenzkompetenz fundamentally requires the recognition of negative kompetenzkompetenz to ensure that courts “refrain from engaging into the examination
of the arbitrators’ jurisdiction before the arbitrators themselves have had an
opportunity to do so.”36 According to this theory, negative kompetenzkompetenz has the added benefit of promoting judicial efficiency by
condensing courts’ role in reviewing arbitrations to a single proceeding of
challenges to the final award as well as jurisdiction.37
In contrast, Bermann concludes that postponing review of jurisdiction
until after the issuance of a final award poses significant efficiency issues,
and he rejects Gaillard and Banifatemi’s promotion of a strict construction of
negative kompetenz-kompetenz.38 Rather, Bermann treats kompetenzkompetenz as a gateway issue, asserting that kompetenz-kompetenz “need
not preclude a court from entertaining a challenge to arbitral jurisdiction
prior to constitution of the arbitral tribunal.”39 Bermann’s approach limits
negative kompetenz-kompetenz by not stripping courts of their power to
hear jurisdictional challenges until the constitution of a tribunal: he would
35. BLACKABY & PARTASIDES WITH REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 352. Gaillard and
Banifatemi argue that protecting arbitration from intentional delaying tactics goes to the very heart
of international commercial arbitration by protecting arbitration’s efficiency. See Gaillard &
Banifatemi, supra note 2, at 260. Additionally, Gaillard and Banifatemi contend that negative
kompetenz-kompetenz ensures that parties’ time and resources will not be wasted through
unnecessary concurrent jurisdiction with courts. Id.
36. Id. at 258. Restricting concurrent jurisdiction ensures that parties’ time and resources are not
unnecessarily wasted. Id. at 260. However, Bermann asserts that negative kompetenz-kompetenz
creates its own type of inefficiency: permitting the entire arbitral process to proceed, with the
associated costs and time, only to have a court hold there was no jurisdictional after the issuance of
the final award. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem, supra note 12, at 19; see, e.g., Part III.B.
37. See Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 2, at 260–61. However, while negative kompetenzkompetenz may increase judicial efficiency, it may decrease overall efficiency. See discussion supra
note 36.
38. See Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem, supra note 12, at 19; see also George A. Bermann,
The U.K. Supreme Court Speaks to International Arbitration: Learning from the Dallah Case, 22
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 18–19 (2011) [hereinafter Bermann, The U.K. Supreme Court Speaks].
39. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem, supra note 12, at 15. Bermann contends that the
pertinent issue in determining the correct approach to kompetenz-kompetenz is whether an arbitral
tribunal has already been established to begin exercising its kompetenz-kompetenz. Id.
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permit judicial recourse before the constitution of a tribunal but restrict it
afterwards.40
III. VARYING APPROACHES: THE CURRENT STATE OF LAW IN THE U.S. AND
U.K.
A. The U.S. Approach
1. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan: A Presumption Against
Kompetenz-Kompetenz
First Options, a brokerage firm that clears trades on the Philadelphia
Stock Exchange, cleared the trading account of MK Investments (MKI), a
wholly-owned investment company of Manuel and Carol Kaplan.41 The
Kaplans and First Options signed a “workout” agreement consisting of four
documents that governed the resolution of the debts that MKI and the
Kaplans owed First Options as a result of the stock market crash of October
1987.42 After MKI incurred significant additional loses, First Options
liquidated its assets and demanded that the Kaplans personally pay any of
MKI’s deficiency.43 First Options sought arbitration after MKI and the
Kaplans failed to pay the debt.44
Only one of the four documents contained in the workout agreement
contained an arbitration clause.45 MKI, having signed that document,
submitted to arbitration.46 The Kaplans, however, had not personally signed
the document containing the AAG and insisted that the arbitration panel did

40. Id. at 14–21. Bermann favors the German approach to kompetenz-kompetenz, which permits
courts to hear jurisdictional challenges to arbitration prior to a tribunal’s constitution. Id. at 19–21.
However, after the constitution of a tribunal, German courts will take concurrent jurisdiction over
jurisdictional challenges but do not permit the stay of arbitration. Id. at 21. This removes the
potential for parties to use judicial recourse as a delaying tactic for arbitration. Id. Although, it does
not resolve resource drain of concurrent jurisdiction that Gaillard and Banifatemi were concerned
with. See discussion supra note 36.
41. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 940 (1995).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 941.
46. Id.
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not have jurisdiction over their claims.47 The panel, exercising its
kompetenz-kompetenz, ruled that it had jurisdiction over the Kaplans and
issued a final award in favor of First Options.48 The Kaplans appealed to the
Federal District Court requesting that the award be vacated for lack of
jurisdiction.49 The district court confirmed the award, the Third Circuit
reversed, and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, finding no arbitral
jurisdiction.50
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to define the bounds of
kompetenz-kompetenz in American jurisprudence.51 The Court took a
heavily contractual view of kompetenz-kompetenz and instructed that
tribunals do not have the power to decide arbitral jurisdiction unless the
parties have provided for kompetenz-kompetenz by “‘clea[r] and
unmistakabl[e]’” language.52 Just as the arbitrability of the merits of a
dispute turns on whether the parties contractually agreed to arbitrate that
dispute, the issue of who determines the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal
turns on what the parties contractually agreed on that matter.53 The Court
further opined that such a high showing of intent was proper because parties
were relinquishing the “practical value” of their right to judicial recourse,
displaying the preference of U.S. courts for resolution through courts rather
than arbitration.54
Under the “clear and unmistakable” standard, American courts begin
their jurisdictional analysis with the presumption that tribunals do not have
kompetenz-kompetenz to determine jurisdiction.55 This presumption takes
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 941, 949.
51. Id. at 942.
52. Id. at 944 (alterations in original) (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commuc’ns Workers of Am.,
475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)). The Court’s analysis turned largely on its view that “arbitration is
simply a matter of contract.” First Options, 514 U.S. at 943.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 942. The Court further displayed its preference for adjudication over arbitration when
it stated that a lower threshold requirement than clear and unmistakable evidence “might too often
force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would have thought a judge, not an
arbitrator, would decide.” Id. at 945.
55. Id. at 944. The Court employs a higher threshold requirement for parties to provide a
tribunal with kompetenz-kompetenz: whereas the arbitrability of a merits issue is given the
presumption of assent by the Court when the agreement is silent as to the particular issue, the Court
reverses the presumption on the jurisdictional issue. Id. at 944–45. The Court’s rationale was that it
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root in the Court’s contractual view of kompetenz-kompetenz.56 The Court
held that when contracts are silent as to the arbitrability of jurisdiction, the
parties’ most likely intent was not to submit the issue to arbitration.57
Furthermore, any review of jurisdictional rulings made by tribunals to which
kompetenz-kompetenz was not clearly and unmistakably given must be
analyzed by courts without deference to the tribunal’s findings.58 In this
way, the Court’s precedent calls into question fundamental concepts of
positive kompetenz-kompetenz without even contemplating negative
kompetenz-kompetenz.59
2. Repercussions of the U.S. Approach
The repercussions of the U.S. approach to kompetenz-kompetenz are
rooted largely in the U.S.’s lack of statutory authority guiding kompetenzkompetenz60 and the U.S.’s failure to distinguish between domestic and
international arbitration. Although the FAA is a pro-arbitration instrument,
the Court’s pro-adjudication approach to kompetenz-kompetenz reflects
American courts’ suspicion of international arbitration.61 Years after the

is less likely that a party will realize that it is forfeiting its jurisdictional right when it signs an
arbitration agreement. Id. at 945.
56. See id. at 943–47; see also discussion infra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
57. Id. at 945. However, the Court’s contractually-based rationale does not hold true for
international arbitration. See infra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
58. Id. at 946–47.
59. Compare id. at 943–44 (declining to give tribunals power to determine their own jurisdiction
unless parties provide for such power in clear and unmistakable terms), with supra Part II.B.
60. The FAA does not include a provision defining the U.S. approach to kompetenz-kompetenz.
See Smit, supra 1, at 27; Adriana Dulic, Note, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan and the
Kompetenz-Kompetenz Principle, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 77, 91–92 (2002). Rather, kompetenzkompetenz is purely defined by the courts. In contrast, most other States have more fully developed
arbitration statutes that specifically address kompetenz-kompetenz. See, e.g., Arbitration Act 1996,
c.23, § 30 (Eng., Wales, N. Ir.).
61. The Second Circuit stated:
Our deference to arbitrators has gone beyond the bounds of common sense. I cannot
understand the process of reasoning by which any court can leave to the unfettered
discretion of an arbitrator the determination of whether there is any duty to arbitrate. I
am even more mystified that a court could permit such unrestrained power to be
exercised by the very person who will profit by deciding that an obligation to arbitrate
survives, thus ensuring his own business. It is too much to expect even the most fairminded arbitrator to be impartial when it comes to determining the extent of his own
profit. We do not let judges make decisions which fix the extent of their fees. . . . How,
then, can we shut our eyes to the obvious self-interest of an arbitrator?
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First Options decision, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s
kompetenz-kompetenz principle, describing arbitral power as circular.62 The
Seventh Circuit held firm to the “[n]o contract, no power” view taken by the
Supreme Court in First Options and wondered “how else would
jurisdictional disputes be resolved?” then by the judiciary.63
The U.S.’s failure to distinguish between domestic and international
arbitration begins with the legislature’s failure to embody the distinction in
statutes and continues with the judiciary’s failure to separate the two when
setting precedent.64 The negative effects of merging the two forms of
arbitration is seen clearly through the kompetenz-kompetenz standard
created in First Options: while the harsh contractual presumption that parties
have not contemplated arbitral jurisdiction may properly gauge party intent
domestically,65 the same presumption is not as readily applicable to the
international arbitration context.66 Arbitration is the primary, not secondary,
form of resolving international commercial disputes.67 So, when parties—
who are often times sophisticated businesses—assent to an arbitration
agreement, their typical intent is to avoid the mess of international litigation.
Unfortunately, the Court failed to contemplate the repercussions of its
decision on international arbitration and created a broad-based presumption
against positive kompetenz-kompetenz for domestic as well as international
arbitrations.68

Ottley v. Sheepshead Nursing Home, 688 F.2d 883, 898 (2d Cir. 1982) (Lumbard, J., dissenting)
(internal citations omitted).
62. Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 591 (7th Cir. 2001).
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., First Options, supra Part III.A (domestic case that will now apply to international
arbitrations under U.S. law).
65. First Options dealt with a domestic arbitration. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying
text.
66. Robert H. Smit, Separability and Competence-Competence in International Arbitration: Ex
Nihilo Nihil Fit? Or Can Something Indeed Come from Nothing?, 13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 19, 29–
30 (“[E]ven if the First Options presumption that parties intend to litigate rather than arbitrate issues
of arbitrability were appropriate in the domestic context, it would be inappropriate to import that
presumption into the international arena.”).
67. Id. at 30.
68. See First Options, supra note 41.
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B. The U.K. Approach
1. Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co. v. Pakistan
The dispute in Dallah concerned a 1996 contract between Dallah Real
Estate and Tourism Holding Company and the Awami Hajj Trust—a trust
created by the Government of Pakistan.69 The contract between Dallah and
the Trust provided Dallah’s construction of housing for pilgrims visiting
holy sites in Saudi Arabia.70 In 1995, the Government of Pakistan agreed to
Dallah’s terms in a Memorandum of Understanding.71 The terms of the
contract were finalized in 1996, and Dallah and the Trust—not the Pakistani
Government—signed the contract, which included a valid AAG directing
any dispute to International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) arbitration.72
Subsequently, the regime in Pakistan fell from power and was replaced.73
The new governmental authorities pursued no further actions in regards to
the contract with Dallah, and the Trust ceased to exist as a legal entity as of
December 11, 1996.74
Dallah initiated ICC arbitration against the Government on May 19,
1998 in France.75 The Government at all points during the arbitration and
subsequent litigation denied being party to any AAG.76 The ICC arbitral
tribunal, exercising its kompetenz-kompetenz, ruled that it had proper
jurisdiction over the claims brought against the Government in a partial
award dated June 26, 2001.77 The tribunal subsequently found the
Government liable for Dallah’s damages, and after over eight years of
arbitration, it issued a final award against the Government for $20,588,040
USD.78 Dallah sought enforcement of the award in England.79 The High
Court refused to recognize the award because the tribunal lacked jurisdiction
69. Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co. v. Pakistan, [2010] UKSC 46, [2] (appeal taken
from Eng.), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/UKSC_2009_0165_Judgmentv2.pdf.
70. Id. at [3].
71. Id.
72. Id. at [7].
73. Id. at [8].
74. Id.
75. Id. at [9].
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at [1], [9].
79. Id. at [10].
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over the Government, and the Court of Appeals dismissed Dallah’s appeal.80
The U.K. Supreme Court—applying French law as the law of situs81—
determined that the Government was not a signatory of the arbitration
agreement.82 It then denied enforcement of the arbitration award for lack of
jurisdiction because the Government was not a party to the AAG and did not
qualify as an unnamed third party.83 The U.K. Supreme Court interpreted
the French case law as applying an arbitration agreement to an unnamed
third party only:
[P]rovided that it is established that their contractual situation, their
activities and the normal commercial relations existing between the
parties allow it to be presumed that they have accepted the
arbitration clause of which they knew the existence and scope, even
though they were not signatories of the contract containing it.84
The Court rejected Dallah’s argument that a reviewing court other than a
court of the seat of arbitration should review a tribunal’s jurisdictional
findings under kompetenz-kompetenz facially and flexibly, granting

80. Id.
81. Id. at [17].
82. Id. at [34]–[35].
83. Id at [69]. While the U.K. Supreme Court identified the correct legal standard to apply under
French law, see infra note 84 and accompanying text, the U.K. Supreme Court did not properly
apply that per the subsequent ruling of the French Court d’Appel. Cour de’appel [CA] [regional
court of appeal] Paris, Feb. 17, 2001, No. 09/28533, Gouvernement du Pakistan Ministere des
Affaires Religieuses v. Societe Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co. After successfully
fending off enforcement of the award in England, the Government of Pakistan challenged the award
itself in French courts. Id. The French Court of Appeal applied the same French law standard as the
U.K. Supreme Court but concluded that the Government of Pakistan had intended to be bound by the
arbitration agreement. Id. Therefore, while the Government successfully avoided enforcement in
England, Dallah’s award is still valid to seek enforcement in any other New York Convention
signatory. See Jacopo Crivellaro, Conflicting Contrasts in Dallah v. Government of Pakistan, 17
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 51 (2011), http://www.cjel.net/online/17_2-crivellaro/.
84. See Dallah, supra note 69 at [18] (quoting in translation Cour de’appel [CA] [regional court
of appeal] 1e civ., 1992, Bull. Civ. I, No. 95 (Fr.) Orri v. Societe des Lubrifiants Elf Aquitaine,
Revue de l’Arbitrage 95 (Fr.)). The applicable French law required the application of customary
practices of international law to determine if the tribunal properly exercised jurisdiction. Dallah,
supra note 69 at [18]. The U.K. Supreme Court noted that it was “difficult to conceive that any
more relaxed test would be consistent with justice and reasonable commercial expectations” but still
found that the Government did not qualify as a third party to the arbitration agreement. Id.; supra
note 83 and accompanying text.
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evidentiary deference to the tribunal’s choice.85 Instead, the Court
performed its own, independent review of jurisdiction with no deference to
the tribunal’s conclusion on jurisdiction.86
Taking a contractual view of arbitration, the Court’s analysis of
kompetenz-kompetenz relied heavily on what the relevant parties assented to
in the contract.87 The Court recognized the need for arbitrators to determine
the extent of their authority over a dispute but declined to give the
kompetenz-kompetenz to do so without having the power conferred upon
them by each party.88 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the
U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in First Options that “clear and unmistakable
evidence” must be given to show specific agreement.89 Based on this
significant limitation of arbitral jurisdiction, the U.K. Supreme Court
concluded that no deference is given to a tribunal’s kompetenz-kompetenz
when an issue arises as to the validity of the exercise of that power.90
2. The Effect of Dallah
Dallah set firm precedent that English courts will give no deference to
85. Id. Dallah contended that a reviewing court outside the country of the seat of arbitration
should refuse to become involved in the jurisdictional matter when the tribunal’s conclusions were
facially plausible or “reasonably supportable.” Id. In rejecting this point of view, the Court
concluded that Dallah’s position that the courts of the seat of arbitration held a special power to
review jurisdiction undermines fundamental concepts of international commercial arbitration. Id. at
15 (referring to Dallah’s argument as “iron[ic]”). The benefit of international arbitration—
transnational enforcement under the NY Convention—requires a transnational view of review and
enforcement that cannot be tied to a singular country. See id.
86. See id. at [21]–[29]. Specifically, the Court expressed concern that kompetenz-kompetenz
was too often viewed as permitting arbitrators to be the sole judges of jurisdiction when “the real
purpose of the [kompetenz-kompetenz] rule is in no way to leave the question of the arbitrators’
jurisdiction in the hands of the arbitrators alone.” Id. at [22] (internal citations and quotations
omitted). The Court rejected this view as neither logical nor acceptable and determined that
jurisdiction must be fully reviewed by the court in which enforcement is sought. Id. at [23]. In
performing this analysis, the Court found that the Government had proven that there was no common
intention for it to be bound by the arbitration agreement. Id. at [39].
87. See id. at [24]–[26].
88. Id. at [24] (“Arbitrators (like many other decision-making bodies) may from time to time find
themselves faced with challenges to their role or powers, and have in that event to consider the
existence and extent of their authority to decide particular issues involving particular persons. But,
absent specific authority to do this, they cannot by their own decision on such matters create or
extend the authority conferred upon them.”).
89. Id. at 13; see also First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943–44 (1995).
90. Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co. v. Pakistan, [2010] UKSC 46, [30].
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arbitral jurisdictional rulings, and it represents the inefficiency of the
negative kompetenz-kompetenz model.91 The U.K. Supreme Court’s
holding that jurisdictional rulings are not to be given any deference in
reviewing their validity has already begun to affect lower courts’ application
of kompetenz-kompetenz.92 In the aftermath of Dallah, English courts will
not presume that the defendant of a jurisdictional challenge is in a favorable
position because an arbitral tribunal ruled in its favor.93 This lack of
deference to the decisions of abritrators as to jurisdiction undermines the
basic premise of kompetenz-kompetenz by giving arbitral findings under
that authority no subsequent legal effect. The result is a lack of security in
the exercise of kompetenz-kompetenz, which threatens to impact the U.K.’s
reputation as a pro-enforcement jurisdiction.94
Dallah also illustrates the inefficiency of negative kompetenzkompetenz, which is the model used by French courts (the law of the AAG
in Dallah).95 In Dallah, the entire arbitral process had been completed from
a partial award on jurisdiction, to a partial award on liability, to a final award
with damages before the jurisdictional issue was ever heard by a court of
law.96 Indeed, it was not until the enforcement stage that judicial recourse
concerning jurisdiction—which the Government had challenged from the
beginning—was ever heard97 because French law’s negative kompetenzkompetenz prohibited judicial recourse anytime before a final award.98 The
result is a lesson in the inefficiency of such an approach: a long and
expensive arbitration may be completed but never enforced due to the

91. See Bermann, The U.K. Supreme Court Speaks, supra note 38, at 19–20.
92. See, e.g., A v. B [2010] EWHC 3302 (Eng., Wales). In A v. B, the English commercial court
applied the Court’s ruling in Dallah to a domestic arbitration. Id. at [25] A lost an award in an
arbitration proceeding and brought a jurisdictional challenge—a section 67 challenge—to the court.
Id. at [1]. B responded with an application to the court to secure his arbitral award—a section 70(7)
application—but his request for security of the award was dismissed. Id. at [2]. The commercial
court, interpreting Dallah, held that challenges to arbitral jurisdiction now require a “complete
rehearing and not a review.” Id. at [23].
93. Gary Born, The Impact of Dallah, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Feb 10, 2011),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2011/02/10/the-impact-of-dallah/.
94. Id.
95. See Bermann, The U.K. Supreme Court Speaks, supra note 38, at 19–20.
96. Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co. v. Pakistan, [2010] UKSC 46, [9].
97. Id.
98. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem, supra note 12, at 15–19 (describing the French negative
kompetenz-kompetenz approach).
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threshold issue of jurisdiction.99
IV. THE SOLUTION: A REVISED APPROACH TO NEGATIVE KOMPETENZKOMPETENZ
The U.S. and U.K. approaches display the pitfalls of taking an overly
conservative or overly liberal construction of kompetenz-kompetenz.100 In
First Options, the U.S. Supreme Court limited positive kompetenzkompetenz by creating a presumption that arbitrators do not have the power
to determine their own jurisdiction unless clear and unmistakable language
in the AAG bestows it upon them.101 Yet, positive kompetenz-kompetenz is
vital to the efficiency of international commercial arbitration where judicial
recourse is often an inefficient and complicated method of dispute
resolution.102 Furthermore, parties to an international commercial AAG
typically intend to bestow positive kompetenz-kompetenz on a future
tribunal when they sign an AAG.103 As a result, the U.S.’s overly restrictive
approach threatens the core efficiency of international commercial
arbitration by setting a baseline presumption that parties intend to resolve
their disputes in courts.104
In contrast, Dallah displays the inefficiencies that can result from
extending kompetenz-kompetenz beyond its positive dimension to actually
restrict the power of courts (negative kompetenz-kompetenz). While Dallah
was ultimately left with a valid award,105 Bermann’s concerns that negative
kompetenz-kompetenz creates the possibility that an entire arbitral process
will occur only to be overturned on a gateway issue were almost realized by
Dallah.106 Had the French court not upheld the award,107 Dallah would have

99. Bermann, The U.K. Supreme Court Speaks, supra note 38, at 19. Although in the present
case, the resources were not completely wasted because the French court upheld the award and
enforcement could be sought in an alternative jurisdiction. See discussion supra note 83.
100. See infra notes 101–08 and accompanying text.
101. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
102. See supra notes 24, 28 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
104. Id. However, this presumption could always be overcome with the inclusion of clear and
unmistakable language giving the jurisdictional issue to the tribunal. See supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
105. See discussion supra note 83.
106. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
107. See discussion supra note 83.
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proceeded through over eight years of arbitration—with the compiling
costs—only to find out that the tribunal’s jurisdiction was never valid.
Essentially, negative kompetenz-kompetenz prevents courts from resolving
such massive threshold issues until a final award is issued, which may be a
decade or more later.108
A workable solution to kompetenz-kompetenz must balance the U.S.’s
respect for valid challenges to jurisdiction—by providing judicial recourse—
with negative kompetenz-kompetenz’s reverence for the autonomy of
international commercial arbitration.109 The U.S. approach is too restrictive
of a tribunal’s power to determine jurisdiction,110 and the U.K. approach is
alternatively too expansive.111 First, kompetenz-kompetenz in international
commercial arbitration must provide tribunals with the presumption of
positive kompetenz-kompetenz.112
Second, tribunal autonomy and
efficiency must be protected from delaying tactics through a limited form of
negative kompetenz-kompetenz that provides for full review—not simply a
prima facie determination—of a tribunal’s jurisdiction before a final award
is issued.113
Kompetenz-kompetenz in international commercial arbitration must
include a presumption that positive kompetenz-kompetenz exists.114 The
rationale behind the U.S.’s opposite presumption does not hold up in the
international context where parties are specifically seeking to avoid judicial
recourse by opting into the primary method of international commercial
dispute resolution: international commercial arbitration.115
Positive
kompetenz-kompetenz not only reflects the likely intent of international
commercial actors, but it protects the arbitration process from unnecessary
interference, increasing efficiency.116 Furthermore, positive kompetenzkompetenz puts the jurisdictional question in the hands of more qualified
108. See supra Part III.B.2. Although a court under Gaillard and Banifatemi’s view must wait
until the “end of the arbitral process”, a prima facie review of jurisdiction can be made at the outset.
Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 2, at 259–60. However, a prima facie review does not preclude
the possibility of a subsequent full review discovering that no jurisdiction exists. See id.
109. See infra notes 117–23 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 101–04 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 114–17 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 118–21 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
116. See supra Part II.B.
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decision makers—arbitrators—that are familiar with the procedures of
international commercial arbitration, conflicts of law, and application of
laws from varying countries.117
In order to prevent improper delaying tactics at the outset of arbitration,
kompetenz-kompetenz must also have a negative dimension; however,
negative kompetenz-kompetenz should be less expansive than Galliard and
Banifatemi’s assertion that challenges must wait until a final award has been
issued.118 A more balanced approach would prohibit recourse to courts only
during the jurisdictional phase of arbitration.119 Once a partial award as to
jurisdiction is rendered, a party seeking to challenge jurisdiction should have
full recourse to courts. Admittedly, judicial recourse can be a long process
that can drive up costs through concurrent jurisdiction and can act as a
delaying tactic to halt arbitration through a stay.120 To remedy these defects,
the court hearing the jurisdictional challenge should determine as an initial
matter whether a stay of the arbitral proceedings during the litigation of the
jurisdictional issue is proper, or whether the litigation and arbitrations should
proceed concurrently.121 A motion for stay of arbitration would trigger a
prima facie review of the AAG by the court at the outset of the litigation to
allow courts to discern the initial validity of the challenge. If it appears as if
the challenge holds little merit and may be a delaying tactic, then the sitting
court on its prima facie review should permit arbitration to proceed with
concurrent jurisdiction (similar to the German approach122). However, if the
court’s prima facie review concludes that a valid jurisdictional issue is
present, the court should stay the arbitration until the court rules fully on the
tribunal’s jurisdiction. In this way, the court can balance the two conflicting
interests of judicial challenges for jurisdiction by hearing valid challenges to
jurisdiction but not permitting meritless delaying tactics to slow the arbitral
process.
A presumption of positive kompetenz-kompetenz balanced with a

117. See, e.g. discussion supra note 83 (describing how the U.K. Supreme Court incorrectly
applied French law, whereas the arbitrators’ decision that the jurisdiction was proper under French
law was upheld by the French Cour d’Appel).
118. See supra notes 31–40 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 120–23 and accompanying text.
120. See discussion supra note 35.
121. In this way, my view differs from the German model that creates concurrent jurisdiction
between courts and an ongoing tribunal. See discussion supra note 40.
122. See discussion supra note 40.
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restricted form of negative kompetenz-kompetenz allows arbitrations to be
the initial jurisdiction decision makers without precluding valid challenges
to jurisdiction until the issuance of a final award.123 While a singular
solution to two competing dispute resolution systems will always have its
shortcomings, this revised version of kompetenz-kompetenz respects the role
of both systems and permits recourse for parties with genuine challenges to a
tribunal’s jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION
States, given the discretion to define the bounds of kompetenzkompetenz, have created varying forms of kompetenz-kompetenz.124 The
United States presumes this “inherent power” of arbitrators does not exist.125
In contrast, France not only presumes tribunals have the jurisdiction to
decide jurisdiction, but courts are prevented from engaging in jurisdictional
challenges until a final award is issued.126 An unfortunate result of this was
almost displayed in the U.K.’s refusal to enforce the Dallah award after
finding there was never arbitral jurisdiction over the completed eight-year
arbitration.127 In responding to the shortcomings of the above approaches,
this paper proposes that courts take a middle ground: presume positive
kompetenz-kompetenz and institute a limited form of negative kompetenzkompetenz. By merging the two approaches, kompetenz-kompetenz can
work to promote the greatest amount of arbitral efficiency and autonomy.
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123. See supra notes 114–22 and accompanying text.
124. Compare supra Part III.A, with supra Part III.B.
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